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This paper investigates the impact of product differentiation on firm-specific and
industry-wide cost pass-through in grocery retailing. We use attribute distance
measures to model product differentiation based on a unique set of retail scanner data
for ready-to-eat soup products in the Canadian market. Results from a panel error
correction model suggest that product differentiation explains a significant share of the
variation in the rate of cost pass-through across products. More differentiated
products are associated with lower rates of cost pass-through of industry-wide and
higher pass-through of firm-specific costs shocks. The findings validate an oligopolistic
model of product differentiation, where firms use differentiation as a non-price
competitive factor in strategic pricing decisions.
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industry-wide costs, firm-specific costs, food retail markets, ready-to-eat soups,
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1. Introduction
The impact of competition on firms’ pass-through of cost shocks is well
documented in the literature. Product differentiation is an instrument for
targeting consumer segments and generating price premiums. Given the high
degree of price dispersion for fast-moving consumer goods, the role of
product differentiation in explaining retail price dynamics has yet to be
explicitly analysed in more detail.
Cost pass-through describes the effect of a change in input costs (prices) on
firms’ output prices (Walters et al. 2014).1 ‘Understanding the (cost) pass-
through . . .. is of paramount importance not only for . . .. policy decision-
making but also for portfolio risk management and optimal hedging issues’
(Atil et al. 2014, p. 567). The extent of cost pass-through provides insights
into the division between producer and consumer surplus and can provide
vital information on the level of competition in markets (Walters et al. 2014).
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1 Vertical price transmission is an alternative term which more specifically refers to the
adjustment of output prices to changes in input prices by single firms or aggregates over firms.
Bonnet and Villas-Boas 2016 use the two terms interchangeably. Following Loy and Weiss
(2019), we exclusively use the term cost pass-through.
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In this context, Lloyd (2017, p. 4) refers to Hayek’s observation ‘that the
adjustment of prices is the principal mechanism by which information about
changes in demand and costs is communicated and argues that (vertical) price
transmission can be used as a yardstick to measure the functioning of
markets’.
More recently, economists have started to consider additional variables to
improve the explanatory power of empirical models of cost pass-through,
such as measures of market power, consumer search and menu costs. The
majority of previous studies investigated the symmetry of short-run cost pass-
through processes (Richards et al. 2014; Loy et al. 2015, 2016, Bonnet and
Villas-Boas 2016). Durevall (2018) estimates long-run cost pass-through for
the Swedish retail coffee market and finds significant differences related to
market shares, retailer-owned brands and other product characteristics. Kim
and Cotterill (2008, p. 46) use the term (product) differentiation in the context
of estimating cost pass-through and state that ‘there is a gap in the literature,
as analysts have paid little attention to cost pass-through in differentiated
product markets’. They estimate a structural model to derive product-specific
cost pass-through elasticities and compare these with estimates of a reduced-
form model. Kim and Cotterill (2008) find that the estimates of a reduced-
form model for pooled data fall between the cost pass-through rates from a
structural model under collusion or Nash–Bertrand. While Kim and Cotterill
(2008) see this as a potential bias of reduced-form estimates, their results
could also stem from ignoring the heterogeneity across panel members in
such models.
While the theoretical foundation of structural models is appealing, their
underlying assumptions have implications for the interpretation of empirical
results. Empirical observations dominate the outcome of reduced-form
models and present a better picture of actual relationships. However,
endogeneity remains an issue of both approaches. The richness of the data
available in this paper favours a reduced-form modelling approach also
recommended by Leamer (1983) and Angrist and Pischke (2010).
Most studies that employ reduced-form models prioritise estimating short-
run relationships between input costs and output prices. From a theoretical
perspective, however, long-run relationships are more relevant. Hypotheses
about long-run cost pass-through are well grounded in economic theory; the
theoretical foundation regarding the dynamics of short-run pass-through
rates, however, is still missing. In this paper, we estimate both long-run and
short-run cost pass-through processes. We then compare our results to the
literature and test relevant theoretical hypotheses.
Although there is a rich literature on differentiated product markets,
studies that use explicit measures of product differentiation to explore their
effects on cost pass-through are lacking (Loy and Weiss 2019). A recent
review of existing price transmission theories and empirical findings by
Bakucs et al. (2014) does not mention product differentiation at all. This is
surprising, as the linkage between product differentiation and market power
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is well established. For instance, Baker and Bresnahan (2008, p. 18) argue
that ‘the source of single-firm market power is differentiation’. Forty years
ago, Shubik and Levitan (1980) developed an oligopolistic model based on
Cournot’s and Bertrand’s assumptions to analyse the effects of product
differentiation with a focus on the price–cost equilibrium when different
numbers of firms are competing. Our models build on Shubik and Levitan
(1980) to identify and estimate the direction of cost pass-through for
industry-wide and firm-specific cost shocks.
Loy and Weiss (2019) were the first to empirically estimate the impact of a
product differentiation measure in a reduced-form cost pass-through model
for a European retail market. They show that German yoghurt prices depend
on the level of differentiation in product characteristics. In particular, they
find that industry-wide cost pass-through changes for more differentiated
products. We follow the study by Loy and Weiss (2019) in estimating
different measures of product differentiation and their impact on industry-
wide cost pass-through rates.
We contribute to the literature by studying the effects of product
differentiation on industry-wide and firm-specific cost pass-through.2 Indus-
try-wide costs apply to every producer; firm-specific costs apply only to one
firm or one product. We use the oligopolistic model by Shubik and Levitan
(1980) and Wang and Zhao (2007) to derive hypotheses on the cost pass-
through. Data on firm-specific costs are hard to come by. We use a
comprehensive retail scanner data set which combines retail prices at the UPC
(Universal Product Code) level with the respective purchase prices (retail
costs) of the same item to test the theory.
Our results support the findings by Loy and Weiss (2019). The elasticity of
industry-wide cost pass-through is lower for more differentiated products,
implying that firms differentiate products to generate additional market
power. More differentiated products have higher prices compared to more
similar products. Moreover, firm-specific cost shocks pass on as well;
however, more differentiated products indicate higher firm-specific cost pass-
through elasticities. For the most part, the theoretical model predicts this
well.
The paper outline is as follows. In section 2, we explain the theoretical
framework to derive the effects of product differentiation on cost pass-
through. We develop the concept of measuring product differentiation in
section 3. Section 4 describes the data and the estimation of industry-wide
and firm-specific cost shocks. Following in section 5, we develop the model
specifications and show the main testable hypotheses. In section 6, we present
and discuss the results of the model estimations. In the end, we summarise
our findings and point out some areas for future research.
2 Some authors use the term common for industry-wide (costs) and the term idiosyncratic
for firm-specific (costs). As we find industry-wide and firm-specific to be more intuitive, we use
these terms throughout the paper.
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2. A model of product differentiation and cost pass-through
We follow Shubik and Levitan (1980), Zimmermann and Carlson (2010) and
Wang and Zhao (2007), starting with a market of i symmetric non-
cooperative competitors offering n differentiated products, where ϕ∈ 1,0½ 
symbolises the degree of product differentiation. Zero indicates the maximum
level of product differentiation at which products are completely independent.
When all products are perfect substitutes, ϕ¼1.3 Hence, an increase in ϕ
represents an increase in average product differentiation or a corresponding
reduction in substitutability. qi is firm i’s output. Equation (1) shows an
inverse firm-specific linear demand function (Zimmerman and Carlson
2010).4
pi ¼ αqiþϕ∑ j≠iqj (1)
We derive the profit-maximising quantity of firm i under a symmetric
Cournot–Nash equilibrium (sCN), where qj is a vector of outputs excluding
firm i, by solving the reaction function for marginal costs c assuming




2ϕ n1ð Þ (2)
psCNi ¼
αþ 1ϕ n1ð Þð Þc
2ϕ n1ð Þ (3)
The resulting cost pass-through under Cournot–Nash price–cost equilibrium
is positive yet smaller than one (equation (4)).
∂psCNi
∂c
¼ 1ϕ n1ð Þ
2ϕ n1ð Þ>0 (4)
For a given number of firms, perfectly differentiated products ϕ¼ 0ð Þ produce
a pass-through rate of 50 per cent and firms engage in monopolistic pricing.
This result is similar to the monopoly case in Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983).
When all competitors offer homogeneous products (ϕ = −1), cost pass-
through depends on the number of firms (n/ n + 1). This matches the pass-
3 For ease of comparison and interpretation of the results of the theoretical and the
empirical model, we use identical definitions of product differentiation. The standard definition
of product differentiation in Zimmerman and Carlson’s (2010) theoretical model is reversed
ϕ∈ 0,1½ ð Þ, and therefore, 1 indicates perfect substitutes.
4 The assumption of linear demand is important in this setting. As Weyl and Fabinger (2013)
show, for non-linear demand functions and market power, cost pass-through rates may be
higher compared with perfect competition.
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through of an industry-wide cost shock in a Cournot oligopoly with
homogeneous products (Ten Kate and Niels 2005).
To investigate the impact of product differentiation on firms’ equilibrium




¼ n1ð Þ αcð Þ
2ϕ n1ð Þð Þ2>0 (5)
In equation (5), prices increase with product differentiation. To determine the
effect of product differentiation on the degree of cost pass-through, we





2ϕ n1ð Þð Þ2<0 (6)
Product differentiation reduces the cost pass-through, or in other words, closer
substitutive relationships between products suggest a higher cost pass-
through. Zimmermann and Carlson’s (2010) analysis focuses on the role of
competition, namely the number of firms in the market. Cost pass-through
increases with the number of firms and converges to complete (one to one) cost
pass-through under perfect competition n!∞ð Þ. Therefore, product differ-
entiation and a declining number of firms have a similar impact on cost pass-
through, making the Zimmermann and Carlson (2010) model of product
differentiation a special case of Dixit’s (1979) model.5 While Shubik and
Levitan (1980, p. 69) used a slightly different utility function, the results above
remain unchanged and hold for both Cournot and Bertrand competition with
respect to the signs of derivatives. The results are also robust for alternative
specifications of the Dixit (1979) model (Loy and Weiss 2019). We present the
results for Shubik’s and Levitan’s (1980) model in the Appendix.
Firms not only differ in their product portfolios but also in their levels of
marginal costs, namely firm-specific costs. Retail purchase prices may
therefore differ not only due to product differentiation but also due to firm’s
cost structures and the volumes produced by food processors. In a
differentiated product market, the assumption of symmetric firms appears
to be rather restrictive. For the data under study, we show later that retail
purchase prices vary significantly across products (see Table 3).
We introduce firm asymmetry into the model following Wang and Zhao’s
(2007, p. 174) extensions of Shubik’s and Levitan’s (1980) model.
5 Dixit (1979) uses the following utility function











for i≠j. In the Appendix, we document the
utility function used by Shubik (1980).
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Equation (7) shows the non-symmetric Cournot–Nash (ncCN) price–cost
equilibrium relationship (Wang and Zhao 2007, p. 178). Again, for the ease of
interpretation we transform the product differentiation measure, which
ranges from minus infinity to zero ϕ∈ ∞,0½ ð Þ (Zimmerman and Carlson
2010, p. 8). However, the interpretation of ϕ remains unchanged as higher





2nϕð Þ 2n nþ1ð Þϕð Þþ
nci
2nϕ (7)
ci,c≡∑ci=n are firm-specific and average marginal costs, respectively. To
determine the impact of changes in firm-specific marginal costs on cost pass-





2nϕð Þ 2n nþ1ð Þϕð Þ>0 (8)
As for the case of symmetric firms, when n¼ 1 (monopoly) and products are
independent ϕ¼ 0ð Þ, the cost pass-through rate is 0.5. When the number of
firms increases to infinity n!∞ð Þ, the cost pass-through remains at 0.5,
regardless of the level of product differentiation. Zimmermann and Carlson
(2010, p. 11) simulate the cost pass-through for different numbers of
asymmetric firms. For a single firm (monopoly), the cost pass-through rate is
0.5 and declines with an increasing number of firms. After reaching a
minimum, the rate increases and converges back to the monopoly cost pass-
through rate of 0.5. Firms have low incentives to adjust prices to changes in
firm-specific cost as consumers quickly switch to other firms, which face no
cost changes. Firm-specific costs are passed on at lower rates than for the
monopoly case. This effect becomes stronger with an increasing number of
firms and with a lower degree of product differentiation. The number of firms,
however, also flattens the reaction function in the Cournot model. This leads
to a more uniform firm behaviour and to an increasing cost pass-through rate
as the number of firms increases until the monopolistic cost pass-through
rates are reached (Zimmerman and Carlson 2010).
To derive the impact of product differentiation on firms’ equilibrium prices,
we differentiate equation (7) with respect to product differentiation ϕð Þ




¼ n1ð Þn 4n
2αþn c ϕ4ð Þð Þϕþ 2cþαð Þϕ24α 
ϕ2nð Þ2 n ϕ2ð Þþϕð Þ2 >0, for n>1 (9)
In equation (10), we derive the cost pass-through (equation (8)) with respect
to the measure of product differentiation ϕð Þ. Contrary to the finding for the
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symmetric case, firms offering more differentiated products increase their cost
pass-through. The upper limit for the firm-specific cost pass-through is the




¼ n1ð Þnϕ n ϕ4ð Þþ2ϕð Þ
ϕ2nð Þ2 n ϕ2ð Þþϕð Þ2 >0, for n>1 (10)
To assess the robustness of the Cournot–Nash model under asymmetric cost
structures, Zimmermann and Carlson (2010) also derive the Bertrand
price–cost equilibrium relationship. They confirm the Cournot–Nash results.
The individual cost pass-through rates have the same upper limit. For
competition, cost pass-through rates are always higher, and the rates are
monotonically decreasing with the number of firms. The result with respect to
product differentiation is the same; cost pass-through of firm-specific costs
increases for more differentiated products. Contrary to the Cournot–Nash
model outcome, the presence of product differentiation reinforces the effect of
intensifying competition; an increase in ϕ positively affects a firm’s response
to rivals’ output decisions. Consequently, cost pass-through rates strictly
decline in the number of competing firms (Zimmerman and Carlson 2010).
In conclusion, we expect prices of more differentiated products to be ceteris
paribus higher and cost pass-through of industry-wide cost shocks to be
lower. Cost pass-through is decreasing with product differentiation. For
homogenous products and a large (infinite) number of firms, the cost pass-
through rate is one. The minimum cost pass-through rate of industry-wide
cost shocks is 0.5, as it is in the monopolistic case, implying that 50 per cent of
a cost shock is passed on to the retail price. For individual cost shocks, pass-
through rates increase with product differentiation, starting at a cost pass-
through rate of zero for homogenous products. Independent (perfectly
differentiated) products show a pass-through rate of 0.5 for firm-specific cost
shocks. For homogenous products, individual costs cannot be passed on to
consumers as demand reacts perfectly elastic. For differentiated products,
firms can pass on costs. For independent products, pass-through rates
converge towards the monopolistic rate of 0.5.
The theoretical models discussed so far do not present any information on
the dynamics of the cost pass-through process. Borenstein and Shepard
(2002) argue that market power slows down the cost pass-through process.
Baker and Bresnahan (2008) point out that product differentiation is a means
to generate market power. Thus, we assume that more differentiated products
indicate a more sluggish cost pass-through process. Many empirical studies
test for asymmetric dynamic responses, namely the ‘rocket and feathers’
phenomenon (Tappata 2009). Retailers may exert market power by differ-
entiating their product portfolio to raise prices more rapidly in response to a
cost increase than to cut prices in response to a cost decrease. Borenstein et al.
(1997, p. 324) argue that ‘prices are sticky downward because when input
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prices fall the old output price offers a natural focal point for oligopolistic
sellers’. Thus, for more differentiated products, we expect retailers to adjust
prices more asymmetrically.
3. Measures of product differentiation
We use UPC-specific product attribute information that covers the ingredi-
ents of (canned) soup products, brand names, flavours and package sizes. The
data are obtained from Mintel’s Global New Products Database (Mintel
2015). Product ingredient data include calories, fat, cholesterol, sodium,
carbohydrates, fibres, sugar and protein content, of which two characteristics,
brand names and flavours, are discrete variables. In total, the measurement of
product differentiation is based on eleven product attributes. The sample
includes four brands and seven flavours, for which we create dummy
variables. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of product attributes.
We assume that each soup product is uniquely placed within the
multidimensional attribute space represented by a vector z of coordinates
of the k attributes z¼ z z1,z2::::::::,zkð Þð Þ. This modelling approach allows us
to conceptualise product differentiation in terms of the underlying attribute
data. The representation of the price of a product as the sum of the values of
its attributes is at the centre of hedonic pricing analysis (Lancaster 1966;
Rosen 1974). Structural models use the assumption that consumers optimise
utility based upon product attributes (Kim and Cotterill 2008). Discrete
choice settings employ an attribute space model of product differentiation
(e.g. McFadden 1974). Consumers are assumed to choose the product that
maximises utility, which again is a function of product attributes. Pinske et al.
(2002) and Pinske and Slade (2004) incorporate a multidimensional measure
of product differentiation in their analysis to reduce the number of model
variables. Similarly, Rojas and Peterson (2008) and Bonanno (2012) make use
of a distance metric to introduce product differentiation to an Almost Ideal
Demand System, and Rojas (2008) analyses advertising patterns.
The estimation of multidimensional differences is similar in nature to the
analysis of multidimensional similarities, such as in cluster analysis. This
allows to use cluster analysis methods to measure the degree of product
differentiation (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 2009, Chapter 2). A common
practice is to standardise all variables that build the product attribute space.
However, aggregation can be difficult due to different attribute scales, for
example continuous and discrete. Further, a variety of distance measures is
available, such as Euclidean, Manhattan City Block or maximum distances
(Cha 2007). In this paper, we follow the measurement of product differen-
tiation in Loy and Weiss (2019) and develop an alternative measure based on
recommendations by Gower (1971), and Gower and Warrens (2017), which
considers aggregation over mixed variables. Krzanowski (1993) recommends
Gower’s coefficient to cope with mixed variables.
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Loy and Weiss (2019) first create separate distance matrices for each product
attribute. They measure the similarity between products by employing the
inverse Euclidean distance as in Rojas and Peterson (2008) and then reverse it
to result in a measure of product differentiation. We deviate here by directly
measuring distances. For discrete variables, we create matrices of zeros and
ones, where one indicates different products and zero indicate similarity in a
product attribute. We then calculate row averages of the matrices. The entries
of these vectors for discrete attributes represent shares of different products, for
example a share of 0.3 means that a specific UPC-coded product is of the same
brand in 70 per cent of all products or differs from 30 per cent of all products.
For continuous attribute variables, we calculate the squared distances between
all product pairs and fill the distance matrices accordingly. We again take row
averages and repeat this procedure for all attributes. We standardise all vectors
to result zero means and standard deviations of one. Then, we sum over all
standardised vectors. Finally, we shift the variable to a minimum of zero and
divide it by the standard deviation (Table 2).
Loy and Weiss (2019) use a second procedure to aggregate mixed variables
by transforming all continuous attributes into binary variables. As this
procedure would eliminate information in our data and may generate some
arbitrary differentiations (Krzanowski 1993), we choose an alternative second
measure following Milligan and Cooper (1988). We standardise all contin-
uous characteristics by using the range to balance the effect of the different
scales. The measure is capable of aggregating over discrete and continuous
data (Gower 1971). The standard element of Gower’s dissimilarity coefficient
is the average of all attributes’ differences. For discrete variables, the distance
is either 0 if the products are of the same brand or flavour or 1 if not. For
continuous variables, we calculate absolute differences in attribute values
between products using a Manhattan or city block distance normalised by the
range of the attribute across all products. The range standardises and renders
the metric scale-invariant; thereby, entries of the distance matrix range from
zero to one. Gower’s dissimilarity coefficient is obtained as the average over
Table 1 Summary statistics of product attributes
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Brand name (1 to 4) 1.74 1.01 1 4
Flavour (1 to 7) 4.01 2.17 1 7
Calories (per cup) 158.10 48.40 30 250
Fat (g/cup) 4.76 4.75 0 15
Cholesterol (mg/cup) 8.33 7.80 0 20
Sodium (mg/cup) 956.90 426.70 360 1700
Carbohydrate (g/cup) 22.52 6.90 4 34
Fibre (g/cup) 2.74 2.24 0 10
Sugar (g/cup) 6.97 7.02 0 20
Protein (g/cup) 5.71 2.03 2 9
Package size (ml) 422.4 181.4 284 796
Source: Own calculation based on Mintel (2015).
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all continuous and discrete distance matrices. Finally, we take the row sum of
the matrix. The resulting variable is divided by its standard deviation and
shifted to a minimum at zero. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the two
measures.
We calculate three additional measures of product differentiation. We use
the same matrices for discrete variables as before. For continuous variables,
we standardise all attribute vectors (zero mean and standard deviation of
one), before we fill the distance matrices for each attribute and sum over all
matrices; for the resulting matrix, we calculate row sums. The vector of row
sums is also standardised to a minimum of zero and variance of 1. Rows 3 to
5 in Table 2 show the results for the additional measures.
We use Euclidian, squared and city block distances. Euclidean and squared
distances make larger differences more significant; as a consequence, the weight
of continuous variables increases over discrete variables, especially if the discrete
distance matrices contain many zeros. Both measures deviate in their mean and
maximum from the Gower coefficient. The city block distance is closer to the
Gower coefficient in terms of its mean and maximum value. The Gower
coefficient and the distance measure based on Loy and Weiss (2019) are almost
identical. Correlations between the product differentiation measures are high, in
particular the Gower and Loy and Weiss (2019) coefficients are very close.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
The analysis in this paper uses a set of weekly store-level retail scanner data
with 178 (T) observations over time (2004 to 2007) for 568 cross-sectional
units (N) (SIEPR-Giannini Data Center 2012).6 The retail stores in the
Table 2 Alternative measures of product differentiation and correlations
Variable Distance metric Mean SD Min Max
ϕG Gower 1.29 1 0 3.46
ϕLW Loy and Weiss 1.30 1 0 3.85
ϕE Euclidian 0.90 1 0 4.76
ϕSD Squared Differ. 0.88 1 0 5.22
ϕBD C. Block Distance 1.15 1 0 4.51
ϕG ϕLW ϕE ϕSD ϕBD
ϕG 1
ϕLW 0.96 1
ϕE 0.87 0.84 1
ϕSD 0.85 0.82 0.99 1
ϕBD 0.95 0.92 0.98 0.97 1
Source: Own calculation based on Mintel (2015).
6 The data were obtained from SIEPR-Giannini Data Center via a research agreement
between the retail chain and co-author Sven Anders at the University of Alberta. The data are
not available due to third-party restrictions.
© 2020 The Authors. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Australia,
Ltd on behalf of Australasian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc
Product differentiation and cost pass-through 1193
sample belong to a major North American retail chain. The data include
information on UPC-level retail prices and respective purchase prices
revealing variable retail costs.
The canned soup category represents a perfect opportunity to investigate
strategic product placement and its implications for cost pass-through. The
soup market is a saturated consumer market with an oligopolistic market
structure with significant non-price competition as indicated by the high
degree of product differentiation in ingredients and nutritional factors. The
leading brand has a market share of 70 per cent. The sample consists of 20
products sold in 70 stores. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of retail and
purchase prices per unit in CA$. The average unit size is about 420 ml, with
products ranging from 284 to 796 ml. We use a logarithmic transformation of
prices to account for the differences in unit sizes and for testing and model
estimation purposes. Over the sample period, the average retail price of
canned soup is 1.92 CA$ per unit, and the average purchase price is 1.48 CA$
per unit. The average markup is 44 cent or about 30 per cent.
The standard deviation or the range over retail and purchase prices
indicates significant price dispersion with coefficients of variation above 100
per cent. Taking averages over the cross section largely diminishes this
variation. The average retail prices show a coefficient of variation of about 7
per cent, which is the same as for the purchase price. Though smaller than the
variation over the cross section, average prices indicate significant changes
over time (see Figure 1).
Panels of price data for products within the same category often show a
high level of cross-correlation. Applying Pesaran’s (2004) test, we find
evidence of cross-sectional dependence for retail and purchase prices,
respectively. Purchase prices represent retailing costs, and cross-correlation
implies that some movements of costs over time are similar to all products.
We therefore separate purchase prices into industry-wide and firm-specific
cost components. We employ two different approaches. First, Pesaran (2006)
approximates unobserved factors in terms of cross-sectional averages to
eliminate the differential effects of unobserved common factors. We follow
this approach and use the average purchase prices over all products (firms) to
Table 3 Summary statistics of retail and purchase prices in CAD$ (2004-2007)
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs.
Retail prices 1.92 2.19 0.35 13.92 101104
Average retail prices# 1.92 0.13 1.59 2.30 178
Logarithms of retail prices prit
 
0.38 0.63 −1.03 2.63 101104
Purchase prices 1.48 1.96 0.22 10.09 101104
Average purchase prices# 1.48 0.11 1.22 1.77 178
Logarithms of purchase prices pwit
 
0.02 0.75 −1.51 2.31 101104
Note:: prit and p
w
it indicate logarithms of prices in the following. # cross-sectional averages.
Source: Own calculation based on SIEPR (2012).
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estimate an industry-wide cost component. The differences between the
individual and the average purchase prices represent the firm-specific cost
component.
For the second approach, we follow Bai and Ng (2002) who estimate the
number of common factors by the method of asymptotic principal compo-
nents. Determining the number of common factors is a model selection
problem. In particular, for panel data with large N and T, the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) is valid and consistent in determining common
factors (Bai and Ng 2002). BIC indicates that purchase prices share one
common factor. Figure 1 illustrates the movement of the average retail prices
and the two measures of industry-wide costs, the average purchase price and
the estimated common factor. Cross-sectional averages of retail and purchase
prices strongly co-move, indicating that industry-wide costs appear to be a
significant driver of average retail prices.
The variation of the industry-wide cost component only makes up a small
amount of the overall variation in purchase prices (see Table 3). Most of the
variation comes from differences between average product purchase prices
(cross-sectional variation). To estimate the variation in firm-specific costs, we
calculate the average of the standard deviation of the individual series of firm-
specific costs. The results show that firm-specific costs vary more than
industry-wide costs over time. While the standard deviation of the industry-
wide component is 0.11, the firm-specific component standard deviation is
0.66. The central limit theorem explains why variations of firm-specific costs
exceed the variation of industry-wide costs.
Figure 1 Average retail prices and measures of industry-wide costs. Note: Correlation between
the first principal component and the average purchase price is 0.97. Weekly average retail and
purchase prices from 2004 to 2007 in CA$. The first principal component is extracted from an
approximate factor model on weekly wholesale prices. Source: Own calculations based on
SIEPR (2012).
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Non-stationarity is a common feature of (retail) price data (Richards et al.
2014; Loy et al. 2015). For panel structures, specific (panel) unit root and co-
integration tests have been developed. Many panels of price data such as the
data under study show strong cross-correlations. First-generation panel unit
root tests ignore this cross-sectional dependence (Breitung and Das 2008).
Additionally, the likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis increases with the
number of panel members (Hanck 2008). Second-generation panel unit root
tests consider cross-sectional dependence. However, Breitung and Das (2008)
show that second-generation tests are invalid when common factors are non-
stationary. Therefore, we subtract cross-sectional means from every time
series before applying ADF and KPSS stationarity tests to each of the
individual panel series and the cross-sectional means separately. The ADF
test result rejects the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for individual panel
series from retail (purchase) prices in 84 (64) per cent of all series at 5 per cent
significance. The KPSS test rejects the null hypothesis of trend stationarity
for the individual retail (purchase) price series at the 5 per cent significance
level in 37 (65) per cent of all series. We follow the KPSS test results, which
for the majority of firm-specific costs rejects stationarity. Table 4 shows the
results of unit root tests for the cross-sectional averages of retail and purchase
prices. The results indicate that both series are non-stationary. A panel with a
factor structure is non-stationary if a common factor is non-stationary and/or
the individual component is non-stationary (Breitung and Das 2008). Thus,
we assume retail prices and purchase prices to be non-stationary. First
differences of all individual and average price series are tested stationary.
Thus, we assume all series to be integrated of order 1.
To check the causal structure of the model, we apply Granger causality
tests to the individual time series of retail and purchase prices and to the
average prices. After fitting a pooled reduced-form panel VAR on individual
series, we use Wald tests with the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all
the lags of the endogenous variable are jointly equal to zero (Love and
Table 4 Phillips–Perron and KPSS tests for average logarithmic prices




−2.05 a) 3 Non-stationary
Purchase price pwit
 




1.51*** b) 10 Stationary
Purchase price pwit
 
1.31*** b) 9 Stationary
Note: a) Optimal lag length is chosen according to Ng and Perron (1995). Critical values 10%: −3.14; 5%:
−3.44; 1%: −4.02. Automatic bandwidth selection is according to Newey and West (1994). b) Critical
values: 10%: 0.35; 5%: 0.46; 1%: 0.74. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. For the
ADF test, optimal lags are chosen according to Ng and Perron (1995). In case of KPSS tests, automatic
bandwidth selection is chosen according to Newey and West (1994).
Source: Own calculations based on SIEPR (2012).
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Zicchino 2006). The results indicate at the 5 per cent level of significance that
purchase prices Granger-cause retail prices and not vice versa.
Panel VARs of non-stationary processes with large numbers of cross-
sectional units have a standard limiting distribution under general conditions
(Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988). In contrast, Wald tests on Granger causality for
non-stationary cross-sectional means may deliver spurious results, because
the test statistic does not follow a chi-square distribution under the null
(Dolado and Lütkepohl 1996). For Granger causality tests of cross-sectional
means, we estimate bivariate VAR specifications with an additional surplus
lag that is not used in the hypothesis test (Dolado and Lütkepohl 1996, Toda
and Yamamoto 1995). The results show that average purchase prices cause
average retail prices and not vice versa. This result holds at the 10 per cent
significance level.7
Westerlund (2007) developed four panel co-integration tests for a null
hypothesis of no panel co-integration against the alternative Hα1ð Þ that at
least one member of the panel is co-integrated. He shows that each statistic
converges to a standard normal distribution and that the tests have sufficient
power even in small samples. We use bootstrapped confidence intervals that
are robust to cross-sectional dependence. Table 5 reports the test results.
All tests reject the null hypothesis of no panel co-integration at the 1 per
cent level of significance. This provides solid evidence of existence of a long-
run equilibrium relationship between retail and industry-wide (average
purchase) and firm-specific costs.
In the next chapter, we develop empirical model specifications to estimate
the long-run price–cost equilibrium and the dynamics of the cost pass-
through process.
Table 5 Westerlund panel co-integration tests
Ho: No co-integration Statistic P-value
Ha1 : Group mean statistics
Groupτ −5.93*** 0.00
Groupα −99.15*** 0.00
Ha2 : Panel statistics
Panelτ −166.27*** 0.00
Panelα −146.92*** 0.00







. H0: no co-integration; bootstrapping critical values with 500 draws. Lag length selected
between 1 and 7 according to AIC. Average selected lag length is between 2 and 3. ***, ** and * denote
1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.
Source: Own calculations based on SIEPR (2012).
7 Detailed results of Granger causality test can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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5. Empirical model specifications
We estimate a reduced-form panel cost pass-through model for i¼ 1, ::::,N
price series of differentiated products over t¼ 1, ::::,T time periods as in
Richards et al. (2014) and Loy and Weiss (2019). To estimate the impact of
product differentiation on retail prices, we introduce the measure of product
differentiation as a right-hand-side variable. To estimate the effect on the
long-run cost pass-through, we introduce a multiplicative term of product
differentiation times the industry-wide cost component. To estimate the
impact of firm-specific costs, we multiply the product differentiation measure
with the firm-specific cost component. These three variables allow us to
estimate the effects of product differentiation on retail prices and on the cost
pass-through rates. Equation (11) shows the final panel model specification:8
prit ¼ β0þβϕϕiþβwpwit þβwϕpwitϕiþβw∗pw∗it þβw∗ϕpw∗it ϕiþνiþuit, (11)
where prit denotes the logarithm of retail prices, p
w
it is the average of the
logarithm of purchase prices (industry-wide costs), and pw∗it stands for firm-
specific costs calculated by the differences between the logarithm of purchase
prices and the average of the logarithm of purchase prices. β0 is the
deterministic intercept. The intercept vi is random with zero mean, and uit is
the error term.
The model specification includes the measure of product differentiation ϕið Þ




. These allow us to
directly test for the impact of product differentiation on industry-wide and
firm-specific cost pass-through. βw and βw∗ define the reference levels of cost
pass-through for homogenous products ϕi¼ 0ð Þ. If βϕ>0, more differentiated
products show higher retail prices: A negative value for βwϕ implies that cost
pass-through for industry-wide costs decreases with the level of product
differentiation. A positive value for βw∗ϕ implies that cost pass-through for
firm-specific costs increases with the level of product differentiation. If
βϕ¼ βwϕ¼ βw∗ϕ¼ 0, product differentiation has no effect on the long-run
price–cost equilibrium.
In a second stage, we investigate the short-term dynamics of the cost pass-
through process by estimating a panel error correction model. To test
whether the degree of product differentiation influences the speed of cost
pass-through adjustment, we introduce a multiplicative interaction term
between the error correction term and the product differentiation measure.
The error correction term ectitð Þ is estimated by the error term in the first
stage (equation (11). Equation (12) shows the panel error correction
specification.
8 Note that identical products may be sold at multiple stores. For the ease of reading, we
suppress store indices.
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Δprit¼ α0þδectit1þδϕectit1ϕiþ∑αwjΔpwitjþ∑αrjΔpritjþ γiþɛit (12)
δ indicates the speed of adjustment back to the price–cost equilibrium
relationship. We expect δ to be negative and larger than minus 1. The closer δ
is to minus 1, the faster is the adjustment. If δϕ≠0, the speed of adjustment
changes with the level of product differentiation: A positive coefficient δϕ
indicates that retail prices of more differentiated products adjust more slowly
to cost shocks, similar to the effect of reduced competition (Borenstein and
Shepard 2002, Loy and Weiss 2019).
We also test for short-run asymmetry in the speed of adjustment of the





Here, the error correction term ectitð Þ is split into positive and negative
observations ectit ¼ ectþit þectit
 
. The ‘rocket and feather’ phenomenon
implies that negative deviations are reduced faster than positive ones (e.g.
Tappata 2009). If product differentiation enforces this behaviour, positive
deviation will be reduced even more slowly and/or negative ones will be
reduced even faster δþϕ>0 or δϕ<0
 
.
In accordance with the theory in section 2, we estimate the model
specification in equations (11), (12) and (13) to test the following set of
hypotheses:
1: βϕ>0, more differentiated products show higher retail prices (equa-
tion (11)).
1: βwϕ<0, more differentiated products have a lower cost pass-through
elasticity of industry-wide cost shocks (equation (11)).
1: βw∗ϕ>0, more differentiated products have a higher cost pass-through
elasticity of product-specific cost shocks (equation (11)).
1: δϕ>0, more differentiated products return more slowly to the long-run
price–cost equilibrium (equation (12)).
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1: δþϕ>0 and=or δϕ<0, product differentiation reinforces the asymmetric
cost pass-through (equation (13)).
6. Estimation results
We estimate the long-run cost pass-through model (equation 11) using both
random-effects and fixed-effects estimators. The random-effects model allows
us to estimate the effects of time-invariant variables (product differentiation).
The fixed-effects model is estimated to check the robustness. The Hausman
test favours the fixed-effects model; however, the differences between the
model estimates are rather small (Hausman 1978). For the random-effects
model, we use two measures of product differentiation, which we discussed
above, the Gower coefficient and the measure used in Loy and Weiss (2019).
Thereby, we test the robustness of the product differentiation measure.
To capture the short-run dynamics of the cost pass-through process, we
estimate the second-stage panel error correction model using the regression
residuals from the first-stage random-effects model. In line with previous
retail cost pass-through studies, we assume purchase prices to be exogenous
(e.g. Richards et al. 2014; Loy et al. 2015, 2016; Loy and Weiss 2019). The
Granger causality tests reported above support this assumption. Table 6
shows the results of the first-stage regression.
The estimation results are very similar for all three models. In the
following, we mainly discuss the favoured model (1), the random-effects
model using the Gower coefficient.
The results of model (1) provide evidence that product differentiation does
exert a significant influence on cost pass-through. The null hypothesis of
βϕ¼ βwϕ¼ βw∗ϕ¼ 0 is tested with a chi-square test and is rejected at one per
cent.9 A high R2 of 0.85 indicates an overall goodness of model fit. All
coefficients show the expected signs and support the theory outlined in section
2. Higher retail prices are charged for more differentiated products
H1 : βϕ>0
 
. The most differentiated soup product max ϕð Þ¼ 3:46ð Þ is about
21 per cent more expensive than the least differentiated product min ϕð Þ¼ 0ð Þ.
A unit increase in product differentiation leads to an expected increase in the
retail price by 6 per cent.
Product differentiation leads to a reduced pass-through of industry-wide
cost shocks H3 : βwϕ<0
 
. The retail price of the most substitutable product
increases on average by 0.95 per cent in response to a one per cent change of
industry-wide costs. For the most differentiated product, the pass-through of
industry-wide cost falls considerably to 71 per cent (0.71 = 0.95–0.07 * 3.46).
The above results are in line with Loy and Weiss (2019) who investigated the
effect of product differentiation on industry-wide cost pass-through the
9 Table A1 in the appendix shows the estimation results based on the alternative distance
measures (Table 2). Overall, the results are robust to alternative specifications of the product
differentiation measure.
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German retail yoghurt market. Their estimates of cost pass-through rates for
the most differentiated and least differentiated products range from 36 to 86
per cent.
For firm-specific cost shocks, we find a positive effect of product
differentiation on retail prices H3 : βw∗ϕ>0
 
. Accordingly, 89 per cent of a
firm-specific cost shock passes on to the retail price of the least differentiated
soup product. Cost pass-through of individual cost shocks is smaller than 100
per cent, thus incomplete. In contrast, the most differentiated product
features a pass-through of firm-specific costs of 106 per cent
(1.06 = 0.89 + 0.05 * 3.46).
The estimated coefficients of the cost pass-through of industry-wide costs
match the results of Loy and Weiss (2019), the outcome of Shubik’s and
Levitan’s (1980) oligopolistic model, and those of Wang and Zhao (2007).
Although the impact of product differentiation on firm-specific costs confirms
the theoretical model, the empirical estimates of cost pass-through rates of
nearly 100 per cent are incompatible with the theory. This, however, may be
due to the theoretical model’s strong assumptions regarding the underlying
structure of the market as well as the functional form of demand. As Weyl
and Fabinger (2013) show, under non-linear demand market power can result
in cost pass-through rates well above 100 per cent.
Further, after separating firm-specific from industry-wide costs into
independent cost components, firm-specific costs and particularly those for
the same firm may still be correlated. Thereby, firm-specific costs may capture
industry-wide costs to some degree. We find correlations between individual
firm-specific costs of 0.2 to 0.5. Thus, a fraction of firm-specific costs also
applies to other products or firms. Therefore, the above estimates may
indicate some bias towards industry-wide cost pass-through.
Table 6 Fixed- and random-effects panel model of cost pass-through (equation (11))









Independent variables, Coeff. ϕ¼ϕG ϕ¼ϕLW ϕ¼ϕG
Product differentiation (PD),βϕ 0.06*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) -
Industry-wide costs,βw 0.95*** (0.05) 0.97*** (0.05) 0.93*** (0.05)
Industry-wide c. * PD,βwϕ −0.07*** (0.03) −0.09*** (0.03) −0.06** (0.03)
Firm-specific costs,βw∗ 0.89*** (0.02) 0.84*** (0.02) 0.82*** (0.02)
Firm-specific c. * PD,βw∗ϕ 0.05** (0.02) 0.09*** (0.02) 0.13*** (0.02)
Constant,β0 0.28*** (0.01) 0.31*** (0.01) 0.37*** (0.00)
R2, within 0.84 0.84 0.84
R2, between 0.91 0.90 0.89
R2, overall 0.85 0.84 0.83
Observations 101,104 101,104 101,104
Note:: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of
significance.
Source: Own calculation based on SIEPR (2012) and Mintel (2015).
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Another reason for why the theory fails to accurately predict higher pass-
through rates of firm-specific costs may lie in the specific structure of the retail
market under study. The theoretical model assumes symmetric firms
producing one product under Cournot or Bertrand competition. The
Canadian retail soup market is dominated by one firm (manufacturer)
producing multiple products with a combined market share of 70 per cent. A
Stackelberg leader–follower model with multiple products may thus better
reflect market structure and outcomes. Further, both prices and quantities
can be strategic variables, which are negotiated simultaneously. Haucap et al.
(2015) argue that traditional models of competition cannot explain the
outcomes of complex negotiations between food processors and retailers.
Gaudin (2016, 2018) presents based on a similar argument results on the
effects of the type of the vertical agreement and the relative bargaining power
on cost pass-through. Future research needs to explore more of these and
other alternative frameworks.
To analyse the short-run dynamics of the cost pass-through processes, we
estimate the two model specifications shown in equations (12) and (13).
Equation (12) replicates the model in Loy and Weiss (2019) and estimates a
symmetric process. As many studies have investigated the ‘rocket and
feathers’ phenomenon, we also estimate the standard asymmetric model
shown in equation (13). Table 7 presents the estimates of the symmetric and
the asymmetric retail cost pass-through model.
Table 7 Symmetric and asymmetric random-effects panel error correction model
Symmetric model (equation (12))




Independent variables, coefficient ϕ¼ϕG ϕ¼ϕLW
Error correction term (ect),δ −0.67*** (0.03) −0.63*** (0.03)
ect * product differentiation,δϕ 0.04*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01)
R2 0.41 0.41
Observations 98,264 98,264
Asymmetric model (equation (13))




Independent variables, coefficient ϕ¼ϕG ϕ¼ϕLW
ect+,δþ −0.67*** (0.05) −0.60*** (0.05)
ect-,δ −0.88*** (0.05) −0.88*** (0.05)
ect+ * product differentiation,δþϕ 0.29*** (0.03) 0.27*** (0.03)
ect- * product differentiation,δϕ 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01)
R2 0.41 0.41
Observations 98,264 98,264
Note:: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance. The
symmetric lag length is determined by AIC. The results of first difference lags of retail and purchase prices
are omitted.
Source: Own calculation based on SIEPR (2012) and Mintel (2015).
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For the symmetric model, we find that relative deviations from the long-
run price–cost equilibrium are adjusted back to the equilibrium at a rate of 63
to 67 per cent per period. Thus, after 4 periods (weeks) 99 per cent of the
deviation from equilibrium is reversed. Loy and Weiss (2019) find a much
slower adjustment process with δ equal to −0.08 to −0.19, an adjustment rate
of 8 to 19 per cent. A reason behind the difference in the speed of adjustment
could be the cost measure. Loy and Weiss (2019) use the price of raw milk as
the retail cost measure for yoghurt. We use product-specific purchase prices,
which are much closer to actual retail costs and therefore produce a better fit
and a faster adjustment. Our results are closer to the findings by Richards
et al. (2014) who report a δ of 57 per cent for ready-to-eat cereal products in
the Los Angeles retail market. Bittmann and Anders (2016) find cost pass-
through rates between 10 and 49 per cent for fresh apples using scanner data.
Finally, Loy et al. (2015) find regime-dependent pass-through rates of
between 15 and 55 per cent in the German dairy retail market.
δϕ measures the effect of product differentiation on the speed of adjustment
back to the price–cost equilibrium. If δϕ>0, product differentiation slows
down the speed of adjustment. With significant estimates of 0.02 to 0.04, we
confirm the hypothesis H4 for both measures of product differentiation.
Retail prices of the most differentiated products move back towards
equilibrium at a rate of 53 per cent instead of 67 per cent for their less
differentiated counterparts (−0.53 = −0.67 + 0.04 * 3.46), a 14 percentage
point difference. Instead of 4 weeks, it takes 6 weeks to reduce the deviation
by 99 per cent. Loy and Weiss (2019) find a similar result for the minimum
and maximum values of product differentiation with a difference of 12.6
percentage points.
The coefficient estimates of the asymmetric model (equation 13) provide
evidence of asymmetry in the speed of adjustment back to the price–cost
equilibrium. As expected, in the context of market power, the asymmetry
reveals a ‘rocket and feathers’ pattern. Positive deviations from the price–cost
equilibrium (ceteris paribus, retail prices and margins are above average) are
reduced at a lower rate than negative deviations (ceteris paribus, retail prices
and margins are below average). The results show that the difference in the
speed of adjustment between positive δþð Þ and negative δð Þ deviations is 11
and 28 percentage points, respectively. Thus, product differentiation enforces
asymmetric behaviour; in particular, the reduction of positive deviations is
slowing down significantly. For the mean value of the product differentiation
measure ϕ¼ 1:3ð Þ, the rate of adjustment for positive deviation is 29 per cent
(−0.29 = −0.67 + 1.3 * 0.29). For negative deviations, the rate of adjustment
is 84 per cent (−0.84 = −0.88 + 1.3 * 0.03). The asymmetry rises from 11
percentage points for the most substitutable product to 55 percentage points
for the most differentiated product.
Richards et al. (2014) and Loy et al. (2016) argue that differences in menu
costs and product variety provide a partial explanation of variations in cost
pass-through rates within product category with comparable levels of product
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differentiation. Loy et al. (2015, 2016) find manufacturer, retailer and brand
characteristics to be important determinants of dynamic (asymmetric) cost
pass-through rates for dairy products in the German retail market. The
authors specifically point to the role product differentiation plays in shaping
the variation of cost pass-through dynamics in their data.
A higher degree of differentiation implies fewer close neighbours in the
product attribute space. Such products may exhibit a higher degree of price
staggering as pass-through of product-specific cost components dominates
the retailer’s pricing decisions, while price-setting decisions for products of
lower differentiation may be more synchronised. These results motivate
future research on retailers’ incentives to set prices less frequently. For
instance, in a framework of costly price adjustment (e.g. menu cost), where
pricing decisions are endogenous, the nature of cost shocks has been shown to
hold implications for the timing of adjustment decisions across competition
firms (e.g. Levy et al. 1998). In turn, state-dependent models of pricing predict
a synchronised price response to cost shocks (Caballero and Engel 1993,
Dotsey et al. 1999), while staggered price adjustments prevail in strategic
responses to relative shocks (Ball and Romer 1989, Lach and Tsiddon 1996,
Fisher and Konieczny, 2000).
7. Conclusions
Many studies that estimate cost pass-through rates or vertical price
transmissions for agricultural and food product markets have focused on
short-run dynamics and in particular on asymmetric ‘rocket and feathers’
adjustments of prices to cost shocks. Over the past decade, researchers have
started to investigate and to test different theories that explain the variation in
cost pass-through dynamics. These theories are built on models of market
power, menu costs or consumer search costs. More widely available data at
higher frequency have greatly supported economists’ ability to test specific
and intricate hypotheses on cost pass-through dynamics.
While theoretical models on the relationship between product differenti-
ation and cost pass-through have been available for some time, to our
knowledge, Loy and Weiss (2019) are the first to explicitly introduce a
measure of product differentiation into a reduced-form model of retail cost
pass-through. The analysis in this paper builds on Loy and Weiss (2019) and
uses a non-address oligopolistic model approach to derive and empirically
estimate the impacts of product differentiation on cost pass-through for
industry-wide and firm-specific cost shocks. We test the theory of cost pass-
through in differentiated oligopolies for a unique data set of ready-to-eat
soup products in the Canadian retail market that includes detailed informa-
tion on product-specific purchase prices, which allow us to differentiate
between and estimate industry-wide and firm-specific costs.
Detailed UPC-level product and brand information allows us to construct
and estimate several distance measures of product differentiation and to
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merge these variables with a large panel of purchase and retail prices. We
employ panel and up-to-date dynamic time-series methods to simultaneously
estimate the impacts of product differentiation on the pass-through of
industry-wide and firm-specific cost shocks.
The theory points to the importance of separating industry-wide and firm-
specific cost shocks and their interaction with product differentiation in the
context of firms’ (retailers’) price-setting behaviour. Acknowledging these
interactions has important implications when making inference about the
welfare outcomes of cost pass-through processes. The results in this paper
suggest that product differentiation is associated with higher margins,
reduced cost pass-through rates for industry-wide cost shocks, and slower
adjustments of retail prices to such cost shocks. Firm-specific cost shocks
increase the cost pass-through for more differentiated products.
These results underline the well-known fact that product differentiation
serves as a market segmentation tool to reduce price competition and is a
source of retail market power, which directly impacts product-specific
markups and cost pass-through. This study thereby closes a gap between the
fields of microeconomic modelling and marketing.
Finally, the limitations of our study provide opportunities for future
research. We already discussed the high pass-through rates of firm-specific
costs and the inherent limitations in how we measure product differentiation.
Although our distance measure reflects a broad set of product available
attribute data, consumer choice and therefore retailer product placement and
pricing decision may be influenced by other, unobserved factors. As Carlton
and Perloff (2015, p. 227) put it: ‘The consumer is always right’. This implies
that consumers may evaluate physically identical products differently and
vice versa. Thus, an open question remains, whether our measure of product
differentiation correctly reflects consumers’ product perceptions. Consumer
choice experiments may answer this question. The many results of hedonic
price analysis in the literature, however, may suggest a close relationship
between these product attributes and consumers’ perception.
Data availability statement
The data were obtained from SIEPR-Giannini Data Center via a research
agreement between the retail chain and co-author Sven Anders at the
University of Alberta. The data are not available due to third party
restrictions.
References
Angrist, J.D. and Pischke, J.S. (2010). The credibility revolution in empirical economics: How
better research design is taking the con out of econometrics, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 24, 3–30.
© 2020 The Authors. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Australia,
Ltd on behalf of Australasian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc
Product differentiation and cost pass-through 1205
Atil, A., Lahiani, A. and Nguyen, D.K. (2014). Asymmetric and nonlinear pass-through of
crude oil prices to gasoline and natural gas prices, Energy Policy 65, 567–573.
Bai, J. and Ng, S. (2002). Determining the number of factors in approximate factor models,
Econometrica 70, 191–221.
Baker, J. and Bresnahan, T.F. (2008). Economic evidence in antitrust: defining markets and
measuring market power, in Buccirossi, P. ed, Handbook of Antitrust Economics. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, pp. 1-42.
Bakucs, Z., Falkowski, J. and Ferto, I. (2014). Does Market Structure Influence Price
Transmission in the Agro-food Sector? A Meta-analysis Perspective, Journal of Agricultural
Economic 65(1), 1–25.
Ball, L. and Romer, D. (1989). The equilibrium and optimal timing of price changes, The
Review of Economic Studies 56, 179–198.
Bittmann, T. and Anders, S. (2016). Seasonal asymmetries in wholesale–retail cost pass-
through, Applied Economics Letters 23, 1065–1068.
Bonanno, A. (2012). Functional foods as differentiated products: the Italian yogurt market,
European Review of Agricultural Economics 40, 45–71.
Bonnet, C. and Villas-Boas, S.B. (2016). An analysis of asymmetric consumer price responses
and asymmetric cost pass-through in the French coffee market, European Review of
Agricultural Economics 43, 781–804.
Borenstein, S. and Shepard, A. (2002). Sticky prices, inventories, and market power in
wholesale gasoline markets, RAND Journal of Economics 33, 116–139.
Borenstein, S., Cameron, A.C. and Gilbert, R. (1997). Do gasoline prices respond
asymmetrically to crude oil price changes?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112,
305–339.
Breitung, J. and Das, S. (2008). Testing for unit roots in panels with a factor structure,
Econometric Theory 24, 88–108.
Bulow, J.I. and Pfleiderer, P. (1983). A note on the effect of cost changes on prices, Journal of
Political Economy 91, 182–185.
Caballero, R.J. and Engel, E.M. (1993). Microeconomic rigidities and aggregate price
dynamics, European Economic Review 37, 697–711.
Carlton, D.W. and Perloff, J.M. (2015). Modern Industrial Organization, 4th Edn. Pearson,
New York.
Cha, S.H. (2007). Comprehensive survey on distance/similarity measures between probability
density functions, International Journal of Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied
Sciences 1, 300–307.
Dixit, A. (1979). A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers, The Bell Journal of
Economics 10, 20–32.
Dolado, J.J. and Lütkepohl, H. (1996). Making Wald tests work for cointegrated VAR
systems, Econometric Reviews 15, 369–386.
Dotsey, M., King, R.G. and Wolman, A.L. (1999). State-dependent pricing and the general
equilibrium dynamics of money and output, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114,
655–690.
Durevall, D. (2018). Cost pass-through in the Swedish coffee market, European Review of
Agricultural Economics 45, 505–529.
Fisher, T.C.G. and Konieczny, J.D. (2000). Synchronization of price changes by multiproduct
firms: evidence from Canadian newspaper prices, Economics Letters 68, 271–277.
Gaudin, G. (2016). Pass-through, vertical contracts, and bargains, Economics Letters 139, 1–4.
Gaudin, G. (2018). Vertical bargaining and retail competition: What drives countervailing
power?, The Economic Journal 128, 2380–2413.
Gower, J.C. (1971). A general coefficient of similarity and some of its properties, Biometrics 27,
857–871.
Gower, J.C. and Warrens, M.J. (2017). Similarity, dissimilarity, and distance, measures of.
Statistics Reference Online, Wiley StatsRef.
© 2020 The Authors. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Australia,
Ltd on behalf of Australasian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc
1206 T. Bittmann et al.
Hanck, C. (2008). The error-in-rejection probability of meta-analytic panel tests, Economics
Letters 101, 27–30.
Haucap, J., Heimeshoff, U., Thorwarth, S. and Wey, C. (2015). Die Sektoruntersuchung des
Bundeskartellamts zur Nachfragemacht im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel. Ein Kommentar aus
ökonomischer Perspektive. DICE Consult GmbH, Düsseldorf. www.dice-consult.de.
Hausman, J.A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics, Econometrica 46, 1251–271.
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W. and Rosen, H.S. (1988). Estimating vector autoregressions with
panel data, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 56, 1371–1395.
Ten Kate, A. and Niels, G. (2005). To what extent are cost savings passed on to consumers?
An oligopoly approach, European Journal of Law and Economics 20, 323–337.
Kaufman, L. and Rousseeuw, P.J. (2009). Finding Groups in Data: An Introduction to Cluster
Analysis. Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, 344. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester,
UK.
Kim, D. and Cotterill, R.W. (2008). Cost pass-through in differentiated product markets: The
Case of U.S. processed cheese, The Journal of Industrial Economics 56, 32–48.
Krzanowski, W.J. (1993). The location model for mixtures of categorical and continuous
variables, Journal of Classification 10, 25–49.
Lach, S. and Tsiddon, D. (1996). Staggering and synchronization in price setting: an empirical
analysis of disaggregated data, American Economic Review 86, 1175–1196.
Lancaster, K.J. (1966). A new approach to consumer theory, Journal of Political Economy 74,
132–157.
Leamer, E.E. (1983). Let’s take the con out of econometrics, The American Economic Review
73, 31–43.
Levy, D., Dutta, S., Bergen, M. and Venable, R. (1998). Price adjustment at multiproduct
retailers, Managerial and Decision Economics 19, 81–120.
Lloyd, T. (2017). Forty years of price transmission research in the food industry: Insights,
challenges and prospects, Journal of Agricultural Economics 68, 3–21.
Love, I. and Zicchino, L. (2006). Financial development and dynamic investment behavior:
Evidence from panel VAR, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 46, 190–210.
Loy, J.-P. and Weiss, C. (2019). Product Differentiation and Cost Pass-Through, Journal of
Agricultural Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-9552.12320.
Loy, J.-P., Holm, T., Steinhagen, C. and Glauben, T. (2015). Cost pass-through in
differentiated product markets: a disaggregated study for milk and butter, European Review
of Agricultural Economics 42, 441–471.
Loy, J.-P., Weiss, C.R. and Glauben, T. (2016). Asymmetric cost pass-through? Empirical
evidence on the role of market power, search and menu costs, Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization 123, 184–192.
McFadden, D. (1974). The measurement of urban travel demand, Journal of Public Economics
3, 303–328.
Milligan, G.W. and Cooper, M.C. (1988). A study of standardization of variables in cluster
analysis, Journal of Classification 5, 181–204.
Mintel (2015). Global New Product Database. Proprietary market database available athttp://
gnpd.mintel.com.
Newey, W.K. and West, K.D. (1994). Automatic lag selection in covariance matrix estimation,
Review of Economic Studies 61, 631–653.
Ng, S. and Perron, P. (1995). Unit root tests in ARMA models with data-dependent methods
for the selection of the truncation lag, Journal of the American Statistical Association 90,
268–281.
Pesaran, M.H. (2004). General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in panels. CESifo
Working Paper No. 1229.
Pesaran, M.H. (2006). Estimation and inference in large heterogeneous panels with a
multifactor error structure, Econometrica 74, 967–1012.
© 2020 The Authors. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Australia,
Ltd on behalf of Australasian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc
Product differentiation and cost pass-through 1207
Pinske, J. and Slade, M.E. (2004). Mergers, brand competition, and the price of a pint,
European Economic Review 48, 617–643.
Pinske, J., Slade, M. and Brett, C. (2002). Spatial price competition: A semiparametric
approach, Econometrica 3, 1111–1153.
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Appendix
The impact of product differentiation in the Cournot (sCN*) and Bertrand (sB*)
oligopoly model by Shubik and Levitan (1980)
Shubik and Levitan (1980) start with a utility function of the following form.






From this preference function, they derive the demand functions and
calculate the price equilibria for the cost symmetric case under Cournot
(sCN*) in A2 and under Bertrand (sB*) competition in A3).
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psCN∗i ¼
nϕð Þαþn 1ϕð Þc
2nϕ nþ1ð Þ (A2)
psB∗i ¼
nαþc n n1ð Þϕð Þ
2nϕ n1ð Þ (A3)
Differentiation with respect to the marginal costs results in the cost pass-
through in A4 and A5.
∂psCN∗i
∂c
¼ n 1ϕð Þ
2n 1þnð Þϕ>0 (A4)
∂psB∗i
∂c
¼ n n1ð Þϕ
2n n1ð Þϕ>0 (A5)
Differentiation of A4 and A5 with respect to product differentiation ϕð Þ





¼ n n1ð Þ




¼ n n1ð Þ
2n n1ð Þϕð Þ2<0 (A7)
Appendix
Table A1 Alternative random-effects panel cost pass-through model (equation (11))








Product differentiation (PD),βϕ 0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
Industry-wide costs,βw 0.91*** (0.02) 0.89*** (0.02) 0.89*** (0.02)
Industry-wide c. * PD,βwϕ 0.05** (0.03) 0.09*** (0.03) 0.05*** (0.02)
Firm-specific costs,βw∗ 0.96*** (0.05) 0.94*** (0.05) 0.98*** (0.05)
Firm-specific c. * PD,βw∗ϕ −0.12*** (0.03) −0.10*** (0.03) −0.12*** (0.03)
Constant,β0 0.34*** (0.01) 0.36*** (0.01) 0.33*** (0.01)
R2, within 0.83 0.84 0.83
R2, between 0.90 0.90 0.90
R2, overall 0.84 0.84 0.85
Observations 101,104 101,104 101,104
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10%
significance.
Source: Own calculation based on SIEPR (2012) and Mintel (2015).
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